What explains how India negotiates international rules and why it signs certain rules but not others? I argue that political economy factors – alignment between institutions and interest groups is a key determinant that explains India’s negotiating strategy at multilateral negotiations and the decision to ratify a particular rule or not. The book claims that when institutional capacity on the issue being negotiated is robust and interest group advocacy is cohesive, India will more likely seek to shape a rule and ratify it thereafter. Does India Negotiate? transcends existing works on India’s multilateral behaviour that generally paints India as an inveterate obstructionist and naysayer while negotiating international rules. The book investigates how India negotiates four specific agreements – Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and GATT’s Uruguay Round Trade Agreement. It draws on extensive archival materials on how each of these negotiations transpired, including official memos from the Indian delegation, multiple interviews with various Indian negotiators and officials linked to these negotiations plus official budgetary and ministerial documents from the Government of India. The book generates new perspectives regarding the motivations driving how rising powers like India behave in the international order, how interdependence influences their institutional response to various international rules and how willing they are to cooperate on issues that affect their rise.